Stopped at the door
Your MX records point to the gateway, so every inbound message is checked for spam, malware and phishing before it reaches your mail server.
- Connects via
- MX records
- Sees
- all inbound mail
- Runs on
- CyberSentriq
We set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your domains, move DMARC to reject without breaking the mail you send, and watch for lookalike domains registered to impersonate you.
Filtering powered by
domain policy says reject
RejectedEach protocol answers one question about an incoming message. None is enough on its own. Together, with DMARC at enforcement, they let receiving servers refuse mail that only pretends to be yours.
Is this server allowed to send for the domain?
What it checks
The receiving server compares the connecting IP address against the list of senders your domain publishes in DNS.
What it misses alone
It checks the hidden envelope sender, not the From address people read, and it breaks when mail is forwarded.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net -allDid the domain sign this message, and is it unchanged?
What it checks
Your mail servers sign each outgoing message. Receivers verify the signature against the public key you publish in DNS.
What it misses alone
A valid signature only proves which domain signed it. An attacker can sign mail perfectly well with a lookalike domain they own.
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAu3x…Does the visible From domain line up, and what happens if it doesn't?
What it checks
Requires SPF or DKIM to pass for the same domain shown in From, tells receivers to reject what fails, and sends you a report of who tried.
What it misses alone
It is only as strong as its policy. At p=none it reports spoofing and blocks none of it.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourcompany.inMany domains publish DMARC and stop at p=none, which reports spoofing and blocks none of it. The work is aligning every real sender so the policy can tighten safely.
inventoryCRM, billing, HR, ticketing, newsletters: anything that sends as your domain. We build the list from DMARC reports, not from memory.
p=noneDMARC goes live in report-only mode. Each legitimate sender gets SPF and DKIM aligned while nothing is being turned away.
p=quarantineTighten in stages. A sender we missed lands in a spam folder, where it can be found and fixed, instead of vanishing.
p=rejectReceiving servers turn away mail that fails. Reports keep arriving, so a new tool that starts sending as you shows up in the next one.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC prove where mail came from, not whether it is safe to open. Filtering covers that at two points on the route. It runs on CyberSentriq's platform, and we set it up and tune it for your mail.
Your MX records point to the gateway, so every inbound message is checked for spam, malware and phishing before it reaches your mail server.
Connects to your cloud mailbox by API and inspects mail after it arrives, where a gateway has no view, including mail between your own users.
DMARC protects the domain you own. It cannot stop someone registering one that looks like it. We watch new registrations for swapped letters, added words and new TLDs, and flag the ones with live mail servers, because those can send mail today.
The costliest emails often pass every check, because they come from a real vendor account that has been taken over. We flag the pattern instead.
Summaries, not legal advice.
DPDP Act, 2023
Section 8(5)
Data fiduciaries must take reasonable security safeguards to prevent a personal data breach. Failing to do so can draw a penalty of up to ₹250 crore.
CERT-In Directions, 2022
Annexure I
Phishing and identity theft are reportable incidents, due within 6 hours of noticing them, with logs kept for 180 days.
Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook.com
Bulk-sender rules
Domains sending 5,000+ messages a day must pass SPF and DKIM and publish DMARC, or risk having their mail rejected.
Not if the senders are found first. That is what the p=none and quarantine stages are for: every legitimate service is aligned before anything is rejected, and the DMARC reports show anything that was missed.
Their filters protect your inbox. They do not stop someone else sending mail that claims to come from your domain to your customers and vendors. Only your own SPF, DKIM and DMARC records do that, and those are yours to publish.
CyberSentriq's. Both the gateway and the in-mailbox layer run on it. We deploy it on your domains, switch your MX records over, tune the policies to your mail, and stay your point of contact for it.
Usually. Gmail, Yahoo and Outlook.com now require authentication from bulk senders, and aligned mail is easier for receivers to trust. It will not fix content or list-hygiene problems on its own.
Someone who can change DNS for your domains, the list of tools you know send email, and an owner for each. The reports surface the ones nobody listed.
Bring a domain. We read its public records with you and lay out what it takes to reach enforcement.
What we look at